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AUSTRALIA’S HERITAGE PROTECTION ACT: AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO COPYRIGHT IN THE STRUGGLE TO 
PROTECT COMMUNAL INTERESTS IN AUTHORED 
WORKS OF FOLKLORE 
Jake Phillips† 
Abstract: Australian indigenous communities are vulnerable to communal harm 
inflicted by the unauthorized, derogatory use of their works of folklore.  Such works are 
often considered sacred to indigenous communities and are granted significant protection 
under customary law.  However, under many circumstances, the 1968 Copyright Act, the 
Australian law governing authored works, fails to protect works of indigenous folklore.  
While an amendment to the Copyright Act appears a likely next step in Australia’s efforts 
to recognize a community’s interest in communal works of folklore, Australia’s Heritage 
Protection Act represents a more appropriate and efficient vehicle for addressing unique 
communal interests in these cultural works. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past four decades, the demand for Aboriginal artwork has 
grown tremendously.1  In 1988, retail sales of Australian Aboriginal art 
totaled $18.5 million dollars (AUD).2  By 1997, estimates valued the 
indigenous arts and crafts industry at over $200 million.3  Regrettably, this 
increase in demand has been accompanied by an increase in the misuse4 of 
artwork representing indigenous folklore.5  Such artwork takes various 
                                                 
†
 Juris doctor expected in 2010, University of Washington School of Law.  The author would like to 
thank Professor Robert Anderson and the editors of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their 
tremendous guidance and assistance.  Any errors or omissions are the author’s alone. 
1
  Danielle Cronin, Appeal to Protect Artists, CANBERRA TIMES (Austl.), Aug. 23, 2008, at A12. 
2
  Colin Golvan, Aboriginal Art and the Protection of Indigenous Cultural Rights, 2 ABORIGINAL L. 
BULL. 5, 5 (1992) (Issue 56), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AboriginalLB/1992/ 
26.html. 
3
  Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander Commission (ATSIC), Cultural Industry Strategy: The 
Vision (1997), http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/41033/ 20060106-0000/ATSIC/programs/Industry_Strategies 
/Cultural_Industry_Strategy/vision.html (last visited Jun. 27, 2009).  
4
  In this Comment, the term misuse refers to the unauthorized use of indigenous works of art in a 
manner that is deemed derogatory and inconsistent with the treatment given by the respective indigenous 
community. 
5
  This comment focuses on current and prospective legal treatment of communal material and 
artistic works that embody indigenous culture and heritage.  Over the years, scholars have employed a 
variety of terms to describe such material.  See, e.g., Daphne Zografos, Legal Protection of Traditional 
Cultural Expressions in East and Southeast Asia: An Unexplored Territory?, 18 AUSTRALIAN INTELL. 
PROP. L. J. 167, 167 n.1 (Aug. 2007) (noting that terms used to describe indigenous cultural material 
“include, but are not limited to:  ‘folklore’, ‘traditional cultural expressions’, ‘expressions of folklore’, 
‘indigenous cultural and intellectual property’, ‘indigenous heritage’, ‘traditional knowledge’”).  United 
Nations Special Rapporteur Erica-Irene Daes states that “[t]he heritage of indigenous peoples is comprised 
of all objects, sites and knowledge the nature or use of which has been transmitted from generation to 
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forms including visual art, song, dance, and oral stories.6  While the focus 
has often been placed on the harms incurred by individual artists and 
creators of folklore,7 indigenous communities also experience significant 
harm when an author’s works are misused.  In one representative case before 
the Federal Court of Australia,8 Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty. Lmt.,9 a carpet 
company reproduced various designs created by indigenous artists on 
manufactured carpets, which it then sold within Australia.10  The 
unauthorized reproduction of the sacred images on carpets, to be trampled 
by homeowners, was “completely inappropriate and offensive” to both the 
artists and their respective communities.11  In fact, even though the artists 
had no control over the misuse of their artwork, they themselves faced 
serious consequences within their communities.12  Potential forms of 
punishment include being exiled from the community, being denied the right 
to paint the community’s stories, or in times past, the offender could be put 
to death.13 
The Milpurrurru case illustrates the importance of folklore within 
indigenous communities.  Indigenous works of folklore symbolize more than 
a product of individual accomplishment worthy of economic reward.14  Such 
works represent “the symbolic connection to [indigenous] culture.”15  For 
instance, certain forms of art are grounded “in myth and ancestral 
spirituality” and are “vehicles for narratives that remain central to ritual, 
                                                                                                                                               
generation, and which is regarded as pertaining to a particular people or its territory.”  This includes “all 
kinds of literary and artistic works such as music, dance, song, ceremonies, symbols and designs, narratives 
and poetry . . .” even those created in the future.  U. N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Final Report, 
Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, ¶¶ 11-12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26 (June 21, 
1995) (prepared by Erica-Irene Daes).  This comment utilizes the term “folklore” and adopts Daes’ 
definition of indigenous heritage and its past, present, and future manifestations where this term is used 
throughout the article. 
6
  See Daes, supra note 5, ¶¶ 11-12.   
7
  See, e.g., Liam Beasley, Millions in Cash Changing Hands, Artists Not Seeing Any, Australian 
Associated Press, July 29, 2003 (noting that current and proposed legislation involving moral rights for 
individual artists does not provide adequate protection with respect to the resale of artwork). 
8
  The Federal Court of Australia is a superior court of record and a court of law and equity 
consisting of a Chief Justice and other Judges that may hold office in accordance with the Federal Court of 
Australia Act.  Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 5(1)-(3) (Austl.), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/fcoaa1976249/s5.html. 
9
  Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty. Ltd. (1994) 54 F.C.R. 240. 
10
  Id. at 243. 
11
  Margaret Martin, What’s In a Painting? The Cultural Harm of Unauthorised Reproduction: 
Milpurrurru & Ors v. Indofurn Pty. Ltd. & Ors, 17 SYDNEY L. REV. 591, 594 (1995). 
12
  Millpurrurru, 54 F.C.R. at 246. 
13
  Id. 
14
  See Samantha Joseph, Protecting Indigenous Culture, 6 INDIGENOUS L. BULL. 18 (2006) (Issue 
18), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ILB/2006/23.html. 
15
  Id. at 18. 
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landholding, and other aspects of lived culture past and present.”16  
Indigenous society has a vital interest, both at the individual and communal 
level, in protecting its culture that has been, and remains, embodied in its 
folklore. 
The Australian government is aware of concerns regarding indigenous 
folklore and has recently taken steps to address the protection of such works.  
For instance, the 2000 Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act17 added an 
effective tool to the Copyright Act18 for attributing credit for an author’s 
work and providing protection against derogatory uses of that work.19  
Derogatory use includes a use or alteration of the work that is “prejudicial to 
the author’s honour or reputation.”20  Although the Copyright Act governs 
the intellectual property of creators of artistic works, the Act fails to provide 
adequate protection for works of folklore involving indigenous community 
interests.  This failure is due in large part to the Copyright Act’s focus upon 
individual protection of authors for a limited period of time; a focus that 
conflicts with the communal and perpetual ownership of such property under 
indigenous customary law. 
This Comment argues that the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Heritage Protection Act (“HPA”)21 offers a more promising vehicle for 
guarding against the misuse of folklore because its protections apply to 
communal works and extend over generations, in contrast to the limited 
protections currently offered under the Copyright Act.  The goals of the HPA 
fit more squarely with indigenous concerns and thus it serves as a stronger 
legal tool for implementing protection of Indigenous folklore.  Part II of this 
Comment examines the historical and contemporary background of current 
Australian law protecting Indigenous creative works.  Part III explores 
relevant international laws and models relating to indigenous folklore.  Part 
IV analyzes the shortcomings of both existing and proposed copyright 
legislation within Australia.  Finally, Part V argues that Australia must 
                                                 
16
  NICHOLAS THOMAS, POSSESSIONS: INDIGENOUS ART, COLONIAL CULTURE 197 (1999). 
17
  Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act, 2000 (Austl.) (amending the Copyright Act, 1968 
(Cth) (Austl.)), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/cara2000342/. 
18
  Copyright Act, 1968 (Cth) (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_ 
act/ca1968133/. 
19
  See generally Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act, 2000.  See, e.g., Meskenas v. ACP 
Publishing Pty Ltd., [2006] FMCA 1136, ¶¶ 1, 2, 39 (holding that the painter of a portrait had a claim for 
right of attribution and the right to not be falsely attributed where his work appeared in a publication 
naming a different person as the painter of the portrait).  
20
  See Copyright Act, § 195AJ (Austl.). 
21
  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act, 1984 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/aatsihpa1984549/ [hereinafter HPA]. 
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reform the HPA to specifically include safeguards for indigenous folklore to 
ensure adequate protection of this important element of communal culture. 
II. COPYRIGHT LAW IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH INDIGENOUS CULTURAL 
BELIEFS AND CANNOT ADEQUATELY PROTECT COMMUNAL INTERESTS 
Copyright law is the branch of intellectual property law that grants 
rights to creators of artistic works.22  Before copyright vests23 in the author, 
the work must satisfy three requirements:  1) it must be original;24 2) it must 
be in material form (i.e., written down or recorded in some tangible form);25 
and 3) it must have an identifiable author.26  Copyright exists automatically 
once these requirements are met and no registration is necessary.27  The 
theory underlying copyright law is that protection encourages authors to 
capitalize economically from their creations and to receive a return on their 
investment by publishing their works.28  Although copyright protection is not 
perpetual, it lasts for the life of the author plus seventy years,29 which 
presumably provides ample duration to provide incentive for the creation of 
new material.30  Furthermore, the law benefits society by encouraging 
production and publication of new material and dissemination of that 
material to the public.31  Thus, the impetus behind copyright law, as with 
intellectual property law in general, is to encourage innovation and invention 
                                                 
22
  See J.A.L. STERLING & GEOFFREY E. HART, COPYRIGHT LAW IN AUSTRALIA AND THE RIGHTS OF 
PERFORMERS, AUTHORS AND COMPOSERS IN THE PACIFIC REGION 18 (1981). 
23
  To vest copyright in an individual is to give legal effect and recognition to that individual’s 
entitlement to exercise those rights granted to an owner of the copyright provided in the Copyright Act 
1968.  See Council of the City of Sydney v. Goldspar Pty. Ltd. [2004] FCA 568, ¶ 91 (stating in contract 
dispute that where a contract vests copyright in one party, other potential authors are not owners of the 
copyright); see, e.g., Copyright Act, 1968, § 135ZZG (Austl.) (providing that copyright does not vest in the 
copier of work who makes valid copies of a work for individuals with disabilities).  See generally BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1594 (8th ed. 2004) (“to confer ownership of (property) upon a person”). 
24
  See Copyright Act, 1968 § 32(1) (Austl.). 
25
  Id. § 22(1). 
26
  Id. § 32(1)-(4).  See also TERRI JANKE, OUR CULTURE: OUR FUTURE—REPORT ON AUSTRALIAN 
INDIGENOUS CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 52-53 (1998), available at http://www. 
wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/folklore/creative_heritage/docs/terry_janke_culture_future.pdf [hereinafter 
JANKE, OUR CULTURE: OUR FUTURE] 
27
  See JANKE, OUR CULTURE: OUR FUTURE, supra note 26, at 51. 
28
  See Joseph Githaiga, Intellectual Property Law and the Protection of Indigenous Folklore and 
Knowledge, 5 MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J.L. at ¶ 4 (1998) (Issue 2), available at 
http:/www.murdoch.edu.au/ elaw/issues/v5n2/githaiga52nf.html.  
29
  Copyright Act, 1968, § 33 (Austl.). 
30
  ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 467 (4th ed. 2007). 
31
  Australian Copyright Council, An Introduction to Copyright in Australia (Mar. 2007), 
http://copyright.org.au/G010.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2009). 
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by rewarding individual authors with a right to economically exploit their 
creations.32 
Indigenous folklore represents an important foundation for both the 
maintenance of traditional and historical indigenous culture, as well as an 
important source for the continuing growth of Australia’s indigenous 
cultures.  Wandjuk Marika, an indigenous artist from the Northern Territory, 
explained the importance stating:  “Our art and culture are very dear to us, 
they embody the past history of my people, our beliefs today, and our 
strength to survive.”33  When indigenous communities assert an interest in a 
work of folklore, the interest represents a desire for the creation not to be 
used in a manner that degrades or undermines the purpose for which it was 
created—that is, to express and acknowledge important aspects of that 
community’s tradition and culture.34 
Adherence by indigenous communities to the traditional laws 
governing their culture35 creates a conflict with Australia’s copyright regime 
because communal concerns and expectations are not addressed by 
Australia’s Copyright Act.36  Customary law remains a guiding force in 
many indigenous communities,37 and encompasses two basic tenets:  
religion and the community.38  As to the first, indigenous folklore is of 
religious significance due to its representation of the Dreaming.  The 
“Dreaming” represents the “knowledge, faith, and practices that derive from 
stories of creation” and is the foundation for the rules, behavior, and 
ceremony governing Aboriginal society.39  Thus, because of the intimate 
connection between indigenous folklore and religious beliefs, customary law 
governs the creation and disposition of indigenous works of art.40  The 
second basic tenet of customary law is the community.41  The community is 
                                                 
32
  See Githaiga, supra note 28, at ¶ 10. 
33
  Joseph, supra note 14, at 18. 
34
  See generally, Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty. Ltd. (1994) 54 F.C.R. 240. 
35
  See, e.g., Dean A. Ellinson, Unauthorized Reproduction of Traditional Aboriginal Art, 17 U. 
N.S.W. L.J. 327, 328 (1994) (“Traditional Aboriginal customary laws continue to apply . . . in many 
Aboriginal communities”). 
36
  See Michael Davis, Indigenous Peoples and Intellectual Property Rights, Department of the 
Parliamentary Library, Research Paper 20, at Introduction (1996-97), http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs 
/rp/1996-97/97rp20.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2009). 
37
  See Ellinson, supra note 35, at 329. 
38
  Rob McLaughlin, Some Problems and Issues in the Recognition of Indigenous Customary Law, 
INDIGENOUS L. BULL. (1996). 
39
  Australian Museum, Dreaming Online: Spirituality, http://www.dreamtime.net.au/indigenous/ 
spirituality.cfm (last visited March 28, 2009).  See also Ellinson, supra note 35, at 330. 
40
  See Ellinson, supra note 35, at 330. 
41
  See McLaughlin, supra note 38. 
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the recognized owner of cultural property, imagery, and folklore.42  
Traditional themes and images must be protected against inappropriate 
reproduction and use.43  Customary law requires that the group approve any 
reproduction of the communally owned culture.44  The creator of the work 
then becomes “a custodian of the cultural property, and any use, alteration or 
reproduction of the work will need to be approved by community elders.”45  
From the community’s perspective, once the creation comes to fruition the 
community owns it because the creation constitutes communal culture.46  
Thus, an inherent disconnect exists between the protections provided under 
copyright law and those recognized under Aboriginal customary law:  while 
the Copyright Act recognizes individual ownership and exclusive rights for 
an author of a work,47 Aboriginal customary laws provide for communal 
ownership over works embodying tribal folklore and culture.48 
A. Despite Recent Legislative Reform, the Copyright Act Still Fails to 
Adequately Protect Indigenous Communal Folklore 
For over twenty years, the lack of legislative protection for Indigenous 
intellectual property in Australia has concerned various groups tasked with 
representing indigenous interests, including the Australian government.49  In 
1981, a Working Party on the Protection of Aboriginal Folklore found that 
existing legislation did not provide sufficient legal protection for artists of 
traditional works of folklore.50  A 1988 review of the Aboriginal Arts and 
Crafts Industry further highlighted the weaknesses of the Copyright Act with 
                                                 
42
  COMMONWEALTH OF AUST. DEP’T OF COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & THE 
ARTS, REPORT OF THE CONTEMPORARY VISUAL ARTS AND CRAFTS INQUIRY 152 (2002), 
http://www.arts.gov.au/public_consultation/earlier-consultations/cvac_inquiry/report (last visited Apr. 11, 
2009) [hereinafter REPORT]. 
43
  See JANKE, OUR CULTURE: OUR FUTURE, supra note 26, at 55 (“Under customary law, Indigenous 
custodians are collectively responsible for ensuring that important cultural images and themes are not 
reproduced inappropriately.  The Indigenous creator must be careful not to distort or misuse the cultural 
knowledge embodied in a work.”). 
44
  See Ellinson, supra note 35, at 331. 
45
  REPORT, supra note 42, at 152. 
46
  See Githaiga, supra note 28, ¶¶ 11-15. 
47
  See Terri Janke & Robynne Quiggin, Indigenous Cultural and Intellectual Property: The Main 
Issues for the Indigenous Arts Industry in 2006, (May 2006), http://www.australiacouncil.gov.au/__data/ 
assets/pdf_file/0013/2704/icip.pdf (last visited May 29, 2009). 
48
  See REPORT, supra note 42, at 152. 
49
  See ABORIGINAL & TORRES STRAIGHT ISLAND COMM'N, RECOGNITION RIGHTS AND REFORM: A 
REPORT TO GOVERNMENT ON NATIVE TITLE SOCIAL JUSTICE MEASURE § 6.35 (1995), available at 
http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/41033/20060106-0000/ATSIC/issues/Indigenous_Rights/social_justice/ 
Recognition/RECOG1.pdf [hereinafter ATSIC REPORT].  
50
  See id. § 6.35. 
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respect to the significant interests in the protection and maintenance of 
indigenous folklore as required under customary laws.51 
The Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act 200052 gave authors 
additional rights in their creative works.  These rights include the right of an 
author to be attributed authorship of a work and the right to not be falsely 
attributed authorship of a work (the right of attribution), and the right to 
prevent derogatory use or treatment of their works (the right of integrity).53  
Collectively, these rights are known as “moral rights.”  Because moral rights 
aim to protect the author’s integrity, they are inalienable, and thus cannot be 
assigned or transferred to another with a sale of the copyrighted work.54  
Furthermore, such rights only accrue when the author has a copyrightable 
work.55  Although moral rights are not specifically designed to protect 
indigenous artists per se as the Act’s provisions apply to all artists, these 
rights do provide indigenous artists with a useful tool to carry out their 
responsibility to protect their works under customary law.56 
In the same year that Parliament added moral rights to the Copyright 
Act, Senator Aden Ridgeway, only the second indigenous person to sit in 
Federal Parliament,57 pushed the Senate to extend moral rights to indigenous 
communities as well.58  The Senator’s proposed amendment would have 
included a definition of indigenous cultural work and would have allowed 
                                                 
51
  See id. § 6.35. 
52
  See generally Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act, 2000, § 193-195AZO, available at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/Act1.nsf/0/D25408DC39D0C132CA257434001EEDAE/
$file/1592000.pdf.  
53
  See Australian Copyright Council, G043, Moral Rights Information Sheet, at 1 (June 2006), 
http://www.copyright.org.au/pdf/acc/infosheets_pdf/g043.pdf/view (last visited July 9, 2009); see also 
Virginia Morrison, The New Moral Rights Legislation, 18 COPYRIGHT REP. 170 (2000), available at 
www.copyright.org.au/pdf/acc/articles_pdf/A01n02.pdf.  
54
  See Terri Janke, Berne Baby Berne: The Berne Convention, Moral Rights and Indigenous People’s 
Cultural Rights, 5 INDIGENOUS L. BULL. 14, 15 (2001) (Issue 6), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ILB/2001/11.html [hereinafter Janke, Berne Baby Berne]. 
55
  Id. at 17. 
56
  See, e.g., Anna Kingsbury, Protecting Indigenous Knowledge and Culture Through Indigenous 
Communal Moral Rights in Copyright Law: Is Australia Leading the Way?, 12 N.Z. BUS. L.Q. 162, 164 
(“[M]oral rights have the potential to accommodate some of the concerns of indigenous peoples . . . . Moral 
rights may be applicable and useful in some cases where economic rights are inadequate, and moral rights 
have a cultural dimension not found in the purely economic rights, making them more suited to protection 
of cultural rather than simply economic value.”). 
57
  Danielle Cronin, In Obama’s Footsteps, CANBERRA TIMES (Austl.), Oct. 31, 2008, 
http://www.canberratimes.com.au/news/opinion/editorial/general/in-obamas-footsteps/1348339.aspx (last 
visited Jun. 27, 2009).  
58
  Helen Dakin, Australian Copyright Council staff attorney, Call for Law Reform for Indigenous 
Artists (Mar. 3, 2003), www.copyright.org.au/pdf/acc/articles_pdf/A03n03.pdf (last visited Jun. 27, 2009) 
(article to be published in Copyright World). 
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communities to assert moral rights with respect to a defined indigenous 
cultural work.59 
Although communal moral rights are still absent from the Copyright 
Act, it appears the government is taking steps to adopt communal moral 
rights in the near future.  In 2003, a governmental joint media release stated 
that “Amendments to the Copyright Act, to be introduced into Parliament 
later this year will give Indigenous communities legal standing to safeguard 
the integrity of creative works embodying community knowledge and 
wisdom.”60  During 2003, a draft amendment was distributed to a few select 
organizations (and one individual) for comment.61  In 2007, the Senate 
Standing Committee on Environment, Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts introduced a report recommending that “the 
government introduce revised legislation on Indigenous communal moral 
rights.”62  However, despite these attempts to create communal moral rights, 
the Copyright Act remains devoid of any provisions extending protection to 
communities. 
B. Judicial Efforts to Protect Indigenous Folklore Highlight the 
Copyright Act’s Inapplicability to Protect Communal Folklore 
Past federal judicial decisions expose inherent inadequacies in the 
protection of indigenous folklore under Australian copyright law.63  Cases 
such as Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank,64 Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty. Lmt.,65 and 
Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles,66 all before the Federal Court of Australia, 
                                                 
59
  Australian Democrats, Press Release, Democrats Seek Government & ALP Support for Indigenous 
Moral Rights (Dec. 7, 2000), http://www.democrats.org.au/news/?press_id=2875&display=1 (last visited 
Jun. 27, 2009). 
60
  Jane Anderson, The Politics of Indigenous Knowledge: Australia’s Proposed Communal Moral 
Rights Bill, 27 U. N.S.W. L.J. 585, 597 (2004) (italics removed) (quoting Dep’t of Comm., Info. & Tech., 
Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Dep’t, & Dep’t of Immigr. & Multicultural & Indigenous Aff., Press 
Release, Indigenous Communities to Get New Protection for Creative Works (May 19, 2003))[hereinafter 
Anderson, The Politics of Indigenous Knowledge]. 
61
  Jane Anderson, Indigenous Communal Moral Rights: The Utility of an Ineffective Law, 5 
INDIGENOUS L. BULL. 8, 8 (2004) (Issue 30), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ 
ILB/2004/15.html [hereinafter Anderson, Indigenous Communal Moral Rights].  The draft was titled 
Copyright Amendment (Indigenous Communal Moral Rights) Bill (Draft Bill).  Id. 
62
  STANDING COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT, COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND 
THE ARTS, INDIGENOUS ART: SECURING THE FUTURE (2007), available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/Committee/ecita_ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-07/indigenous_arts/report/ 
report.pdf. 
63
  See Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia (1991) 21 I.P.R. 481(Austl.); Milpurrurru v. Indofurn 
Pty. Ltd. (1994) 54 F.C.R. 240 (Austl.); Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles Pty. Ltd. (1998) 86 F.C.R. 244 
(Austl.). 
64
  Yumbulul, 21 I.P.R. 481. 
65
  Milpurrurru, 54 F.C.R. 240. 
66
  Bulun Bulun, 41 I.P.R. 513. 
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exhibit a struggle by courts to find a legal remedy to protect indigenous 
ownership rights in communal property.  These three cases highlight the 
inherent conflict that arises when the Copyright Act meets with communal 
property interests.  With each successive case, the courts appear more 
willing to craft protections for communal folklore, but each case also 
highlights the shortcomings of the Copyright Act as an effective remedy to 
this recurring problem. 
In Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia, the Federal Court declined 
to recognize a cause of action for communal harm when the Reserve used 
sacred images on a commemorative ten dollar bank note.67  Mr. Yumbulul, 
an Aboriginal artist, inherited the right to make Morning Star Poles68 from 
his mother’s clan group.  Morning Star Poles are decorated wood poles that 
“have a central role in Aboriginal ceremonies commemorating the deaths of 
important persons, and in inter-clan relationships.”69  The Reserve Bank of 
Australia incorporated one of Mr. Yumbulul’s designs on a Morning Star 
Pole displayed at the Australian Museum in Sydney.70  The bank then 
reproduced an image of that pole on its commemorative note.  Its use of the 
pole and the traditional designs thereon upset the Aboriginal community.71  
The court acknowledged the concerns of Aboriginal communities with the 
regulation of works deriving from communal folklore, but failed to find a 
cause of action for communal harm.72  In recognizing the limits of copyright 
law, presiding Justice Robert French wrote: 
[I]t may . . . be that Australia’s copyright law does not provide 
adequate recognition of Aboriginal community claims to 
regulate the reproduction and use of works which are 
essentially communal in origin.  But to say this, is not to say 
that there has been established in the case, any cause of 
action.73 
Thus, despite the significant harm felt by the community in having one of its 
religious symbols emblazoned on the national currency, the court determined 
that the law did not offer redress. 
                                                 
67
  See Yumbulul, 21 I.P.R. at ¶ 21. 
68
  See id. ¶ 4.  Morning Star Poles are decorated wood poles that “have a central role in Aboriginal 
ceremonies commemorating the deaths of important persons, and in inter-clan relationships.”  Id.  
Construction of the poles differs between clans, and the identifying characteristics of a clan’s Morning Star 
Pole “may be maintained jealously.”  Id. 
69
  See id. 
70
  See id. ¶¶ 4, 20. 
71
  See id. ¶ 21. 
72
  See id. 
73
  See id. 
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Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty. Ltd., decided three years later, illustrates 
the applicability of the Copyright Act to Indigenous individuals, but also 
highlights the Act’s inability to provide substantive protection or forms of 
redress for harmed communities.74  The applicants in the case were three 
living indigenous artists and the representatives of two deceased indigenous 
artists.75  Respondent, Indofurn, manufactured and imported into Australia 
woolen carpets bearing reproductions of the artists’ designs.76  Justice von 
Doussa found that Indofurn had substantially copied the artists’ work and 
was liable for infringements under Section 37 of the Copyright Act.77  In 
deciding remedies for the infringement, Justice von Doussa engaged in a 
lengthy discussion of the monetary harms suffered by the artists.78  However, 
he noted that damages under copyright law only extend to the “pirating of 
cultural heritage” where such pirating directly affects the copyright owner, 
not the community.79  The Australian Copyright Council suggests that 
perhaps “his Honour meant to refer to the fact that the remedies under the 
Copyright Act do not match the remedies that may have been applied were 
the matter governed by customary law.”80  While the individual artists were 
compensated under the Copyright Act, any “[a]nger and distress suffered by 
those around the copyright owner,” such as that felt by the artists’ 
community, were not recognized under copyright law except to the extent 
that it constituted part of the copyright owner’s injury and suffering.81 
In Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles, John Bulun Bulun and George 
Milpurrurru, both leading Aboriginal artists and members of the Ganalbingu 
people, alleged a violation of the Copyright Act by a textile company’s use 
of a piece of artwork painted by Bulun Bulun in 1978.82  The company 
reproduced on its fabric “substantial aspects of the artwork.”83  Bulun Bulun 
argued that the reproduction violated his personal copyright in the painting.  
The textile company conceded that it had infringed on Bulun Bulun’s 
copyright by printing his artwork on their fabric.84  Milpurrurru argued on 
behalf of the Ganalbingu people that the community was an equitable owner 
                                                 
74
  See generally Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty. Ltd. (1994) 54 F.C.R. 240 (Austl.). 
75
  See id. at 243. 
76
  See id. 
77
  See id. at 264, 272. 
78
  See id. at 273-77. 
79
  See id. at 277. 
80
  See Ian McDonald, Copyright and Intellectual Property Concerns of Australia’s Indigenous 
People, http://www.copyright.org.au/publications/A97n12.pdf (last visited May 11, 2009). 
81
  See Milpurrurru, 54 F.C.R. at 277. 
82
  See Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles Pty Ltd (1998) 86 F.C.R. 244, 247 (Austl.). 
83
  Id. at 252. 
84
  See id. at 247-48. 
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of the copyright and thus entitled to legal redress.85  The textile company 
refused to concede that the Ganalbingu community maintained an equitable 
ownership in the copyright.86 
Bulun Bulun created the original work, a bark painting, with the 
permission of the senior members of the Ganalbingu people,87 basing it upon 
traditional communal knowledge passed down for generations.88  
Milpurrurru premised the community’s claim on the theory that under 
Aboriginal customary law, representatives of the community had the power 
“to regulate and control the production and reproduction of the corpus of 
ritual knowledge,”89 which the painting represented.  Thus, while the legal 
title vested only in the artist, the community believed it had an equitable title 
claim based on the artist’s position as fiduciary90 in which he owned the 
copyright in trust for the community.91  The fiduciary relationship arises 
when one person’s “exercise of power or discretion can adversely affect the 
interests of the person to whom the duty is owed.”92  In this case, the artist 
was given permission to paint a work based on trust and confidence in the 
artist that the work would be used and reproduced according to traditional 
custom.93 
The Federal Court first found that although Bulun Bulun had not held 
the copyright as trustee for the community because there was no evidence 
that he had intended to so act,94 there was a fiduciary relationship between 
the artist and the Ganalbingu people.95  As a result of this relationship, Bulun 
Bulun had an obligation not to exploit his artistic work in opposition to 
customary law and, in the event of infringement by a third party, he should 
have taken reasonable and appropriate action to remedy infringement of the 
copyright of the work.96  Thus, although the court accepted the premise that 
“[u]nauthorised reproduction of [the painting] threatens the whole system 
                                                 
85
  See id. at 246-47.  
86
  See id. at 248. 
87
  See id. at 252. 
88
  See id. at 250-51. 
89
  Justice Ronald Sackville, Legal Protection of Indigenous Culture in Australia, 11 CARDOZO J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 711, 741 (2003). 
90
  A fiduciary is “[a] person who is required to act for the benefit of another . . . on all matters within 
the scope of their relationship . . . .”  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 658 (8th ed. 2004). 
91
  Justice Ronald Sackville, supra note 89, at 741. 
92
  Bulun Bulun, 86 F.C.R. at 261 (citing Hospital Products Ltd. v. United States Surgical Corporation 
(1984) 156 C.L.R. 41, 96-97). 
93
  See id. at 250-51. 
94
  See id. at 259. 
95
  See id. at 262. 
96
  See id. at 263. 
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and ways that underpin the stability and continuance of Yolngu97 society,”98 
the court held that the only remedy available to the community in such a 
situation is to bring a claim against the author as a fiduciary in order to force 
the author to exercise his copyright interests in the work.99 
This case exposes the vulnerability of communal rights with respect to 
indigenous folklore and the significance of Australian copyright and 
common laws governing the individual.  However, by folding indigenous 
customary law into Australian fiduciary law, the court was able to provide 
one avenue of potential redress for communities faced with circumstances of 
misappropriation by exercising the copyright second-hand through the artist-
proxy.  Even so, the solution employed by the court relies on a specific 
relationship between the artist and the community, as well as a valid 
copyright interest held by the artist.  It also forces the community to undergo 
the convoluted process of acting as a third party in order to get redress for 
direct harm.  Thus, while communities may be able to employ the Copyright 
Act under certain circumstances, the Act falls far short of providing 
communities with an effective and efficient solution for protecting their 
folklore. 
III. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW PROVIDES GREATER RECOGNITION AND 
PROTECTION FOR INDIGENOUS FOLKLORE 
International authorities recognize the unique challenges facing the 
protection of indigenous cultural expressions.  Although numerous 
international legal guidelines exist, four are essential to a discussion of 
protection of indigenous works of art:  1) The Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”),100 2) the 
Tunis Model Law on Copyright (“Model Law”),101 3) the Model Provisions 
for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against 
                                                 
97
  The Yolngu (or Yolŋu) are an indigenous Australian people inhabiting north-eastern Arnhem Land 
in the Northern Territory of Australia.  The Yolngu are made up of a number of different subgroups or 
clans, of which the Ganalbingu are but one.  See http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Yolngu. 
98
  See Bulun Bulun, 86 F.C.R. at 251. 
99
  See id. at 263. 
100
  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 
3, available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/berne/pdf/trtdocs_wo001.pdf.  
Australia became a signatory to the Berne Convention in 1928.  See World Intellectual Property 
Organization, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html. 
101
 Tunis Model Law on Copyright for Developing Countries (1976), available at 
http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/31318/11866635053tunis_model_law_en-web.pdf/tunis_model_ 
law_en-web.pdf [hereinafter Tunis Model Law].  
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Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions (“Model Provisions”),102 
and 4) the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples.103  Although none of these models and treaties govern Australian 
law with respect to its treatment of communal folklore,104 they represent a 
strong consensus by the international community that such protections are 
necessary to recognizing and preserving rights to artistic works representing 
indigenous culture. 
The Berne Convention provides international protection for works of 
art and literature.  It was formulated in 1886, and was revised in 1971 to 
include a provision allowing countries to designate a specific authority for 
the protection of national folklore.105  However, one scholar notes that 
“[a]lthough the concept of ‘folklore’ is a potentially useful one for 
Indigenous concerns, as it embraces a more holistic notion of culture, the 
term is relatively contentious in its relevance, applicability or 
appropriateness to describe and define indigenous culture.”106  Furthermore, 
the provision is optional, protecting folklore only where a nation has enacted 
domestic statutes that recognize folklore as a protected subject matter and 
authorized “a competent authority to enforce the convention’s vested 
rights.”107  Even where nations meet these requirements, control is wielded 
by the state, which some argue is “antithetical to Indigenous peoples’ 
aspirations for self-determination.”108  Therefore, although the Berne 
Convention provides at least some avenue for protection, the process is 
convoluted and the protection less than ideal from the standpoint of 
indigenous people. 
A more useful tool for indigenous artists is the Berne Convention’s 
moral rights provision, which obliges signatory countries to include 
provisions granting authors a right to claim authorship of a work and to 
                                                 
102
  Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit 
Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions (United Nations Educ., Sci. and Cultural Org. & World Intell. 
Prop. Org. 1985), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0006/000637/063799eb.pdf. 
103
  Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN GAOR, 61st sess., 107th 
plen. mtg., UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter U.N. Declaration]. 
104
  Countries are not bound by U.N. declarations (and Australia is not a signatory of the Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples).  Further, although Australia is a signatory to the Berne Convention 
and thus bound by its provisions, that treaty does not require protection of folklore, though it does provide 
an option for such protection.  See infra Part III. 
105
  See Davis, supra note 36, at International Developments. 
106
  Id. at International Developments; Protection of Folklore. 
107
  Cathryn A. Berryman, Toward More Universal Protection of Intangible Cultural Property, 1 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 293, 315 (1994). 
108
  See Davis, supra note 36, at Protection of Folklore. 
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object to derogatory treatment of their work.109  These rights are inalienable 
and thus the author still maintains the ability to enforce the rights even if 
copyright has been assigned to another.110  Thus, with the addition of moral 
rights legislation, indigenous creators have a substantive means for 
protection of their work, even when the copyright is held by another.  
However, the Berne Convention fails to provide enforceable provisions 
requiring signatory countries to enact legislation that would shield 
communal works of folklore from misuse. 
The 1976 Tunis Model Law on Copyright, developed through the 
World Intellectual Property Organization,111 expands the protections for 
works of folklore suggested by the Berne Convention by exempting folkloric 
works from various copyright requirements.112  For instance, Section 18(i) 
defines folklore to include works by authors or ethnic communities.  Thus, 
this provision skirts the typical requirement under traditional copyright law 
that a work must have an identifiable author, under which “communities” do 
not qualify.113   
The Tunis Model Law also protects “works derived from national 
folklore.”114  Thus, where a work would not normally qualify for copyright 
because the work builds only incrementally on traditional knowledge, and is 
not therefore wholly original, under the Model Law, such works would enjoy 
protection.  Finally, the Model Law exempts folklore from the typical 
fixation requirement.115  Thus, Aboriginal oral stories, traditional dances, and 
performances would be protectable embodiments of folklore despite not 
being fixed in some tangible form (as required by the Australian Copyright 
Act). 
Most recently, in September of 2007 the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(“Declaration”).116  The Declaration represents more than twenty years of 
work by indigenous people to gain international support for recognition of 
                                                 
109
  See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Art. 6bis.  Australia’s 
inclusion of moral rights within the Copyright Act was its response to meet its obligation under the Berne 
Convention.  See Janke, Berne Baby Berne, supra note 54, at 14-15. 
110
  See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Art. 6bis. 
111
  The World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) is a United Nations agency that is 
dedicated to “developing a balanced and accessible international intellectual property (IP) system . . . .”  
The WIPO, created in 1970, administers a wide range of treaties, including the Berne Convention for 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.  One hundred eighty-four countries, including Australia, are 
WIPO members.  See http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/general/1007/wipo_pub_1007.pdf. 
112
  Tunis Model Law § 1(5bis). 
113
  See infra Part IV.A. 
114
  Tunis Model Law § 2(1)(iii). 
115
  See Tunis Model Law § 1(5bis). 
116
  See U.N. Declaration, supra note 103. 
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distinct indigenous cultural rights.117  While numerous articles within the 
Declaration generally address and protect indigenous culture,118 Article 31 
secures a specific right for indigenous peoples to protect and develop their 
cultural heritage and intellectual property.119   
In addition, the Declaration emphasizes the importance of collective 
rights of communities, as opposed to the highly individualized theory 
guiding typical Western human rights discussion.120  Thus, although the 
Declaration is not legally binding, its adoption marks a significant point in 
the recognition of unique indigenous concerns regarding maintenance of 
their communal culture.  Despite the Declaration’s lack of direct application 
to Australia, the underlying principles of the document should inform future 
legal and policy debate aimed at increasing protection of indigenous works 
within Australia. 
As the international community continues its efforts to strengthen and 
expand protection for indigenous works of folklore, Australia must 
implement reform with respect to its own laws governing such works if it 
wants to be recognized as a leader in indigenous rights.  Despite Australia’s 
commitment to moral rights under the Copyright Act, that Act alone is 
unsuitable to provide broader protections for indigenous folklore.  Australia 
should divert its focus from the Copyright Act to the HPA if it hopes to 
upgrade its protections for communities to keep pace with the international 
community. 
IV. AUSTRALIA’S COPYRIGHT ACT FAILS TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE 
PROTECTION FOR INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES 
Because Australia’s Copyright Act governs the treatment of artistic 
and cultural works, it currently represents the most likely defense against 
misuse of traditional works of folklore.  However, in many cases communal 
works of folklore are not covered by Australia’s Copyright Act.121  While the 
Act’s umbrella of protection fits well within the scope of Australian 
intellectual property rights, the Act does not adequately protect indigenous 
                                                 
117
  See Megan Davis, Indigenous Struggles in Standard-Setting: The United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 9 MELB J. INT’L L. 439, 440 (2008). 
118
  See, e.g., U.N. Declaration art. 5 (providing a right for indigenous peoples to maintain and 
strengthen their cultural institutions); id. art. 11 (providing a right for Indigenous peoples to “practice and 
revitalize their cultural traditions and customs”); id. art. 15 (securing for Indigenous peoples the “right to 
the dignity and diversity of their cultures . . .”). 
119
  United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples art. 31. 
120
  See Davis, supra note 117, at 462-63. 
121
  See supra Part II. 
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property arising under traditional customary law.122  Due to the unique 
communal and historic nature of indigenous culture, works of folklore often 
fail to satisfy the elements of copyrightable work.  In cases where an 
individual artist can obtain a copyright, and communities are extended some 
protection by way of a fiduciary relationship with the artist, the protection 
provided under the Copyright Act still fails to adequately protect the 
communal interest in the work.123  Finally, despite the promise of an 
amendment extending individual moral rights to communities, such 
legislation would act only as a minor patch in an act replete with larger holes 
that allow legitimate communal concerns to slip through the Act’s 
protections. 
A. Indigenous Folklore Often Fails to Meet the Elements Required to 
Obtain Copyright Protection 
When an indigenous community grants permission to an artist to 
create a work of folkloric art based on an element of communal culture, the 
community generally has no right under the Copyright Act to protect the 
final product from misappropriation or misuse.  Protection often fails 
because the representative work does not meet the elements under the 
Copyright Act (originality, materiality, and identifiable authorship) that 
would allow the community to own the copyright over the work.124 
Works created on behalf of the community may fail to meet the 
requirement that the work contain sufficiently distinct characteristics so as to 
constitute an “original artistic work” within the meaning of the Copyright 
Act.125  Section 32(1) of the Act provides that copyright exists “in an 
original . . . artistic work.”126  The term “original” is not specifically defined 
within the act.  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines 
“original” as “a model, pattern or archetype that is copied.”127  Originality, it 
seems, is largely contingent on the existence of prior material:  if a newer 
work is premised on a prior model or pattern, only the prior model would 
constitute the original.  Thus, determination of whether a work of folklore is 
                                                 
122
  Johanna Gibson, Justice of Precedent, Justness of Equity: Equitable Protection and Remedies for 
Indigenous Intellectual Property, 6 AUSTRALIAN INDIGENOUS L. REP. 1, at 1 (2001) (Issue 4). 
123
  Cf. Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles Pty. Ltd. (1998) 86 F.C.R. 244 (Austl.) (holding that the only 
recourse for the community is to bring a claim against the fiduciary as opposed to bringing a claim against 
the party who actually misappropriated the communal artwork). 
124
  Rachael Grad, Indigenous Rights and Intellectual Property Law: A Comparison of the United 
States and Australia, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 203, 227 (2003). 
125
  See generally Gibson, supra note 122. 
126
  Copyright Act, 1968 (Cth), § 32(1) (Austl.). 
127
  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1591 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., G & C 
Merriam Co. 1967). 
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original requires reference to prior works to determine if the creation in 
question represents material already in the public domain, or if it is 
sufficiently novel in and of itself to constitute an original.128  The High Court 
of Australia129 (“High Court”) has adopted the view that courts must assess 
the originality of a certain work by examining the substance of the work 
compared to that of another.130  Even where a small portion of another work 
is appropriated, if the portion taken constitutes a “material part” of the 
greater work, then the greater work will not be deemed original under the 
Act.131  For indigenous works in which the artist relies heavily on a pre-
existing traditional design as the material portion of the work, courts will be 
reluctant to find sufficient originality within the meaning of the Copyright 
Act. 
Under the plain meaning of the term “original,” the artistic work in 
question must not be a reproduction of another work.  This restriction 
presents a problem for works created on behalf of an Aboriginal community.  
Artists are often given the task of creating artwork based on prior works or 
based on existing folklore represented by Dreamings or other expressions of 
culture.132  Aboriginal artists that are viewed as having the greatest skill are 
those artists that can render established totemic designs with great “precision 
and fidelity.”133  Each clan owns specific designs that are passed down 
through generations, and select members are taught the sacred designs.134  
Because of the repetitive nature of the designs, such works may not possess 
the originality required under the Copyright Act.  Although courts have 
typically applied a low threshold for establishing originality, “some 
observers caution that despite a lack of prior judicial comment on the matter, 
it is a potentially substantial problem.”135 
In addition to originality, the Copyright Act also requires that the work 
be reduced to material form in order to initiate protection under the Act.136  
                                                 
128
  See Intellectual Property and Traditional Cultural Expressions/Folklore, 9 WORLD INTELL. PROP. 
ORG., Booklet 1. 
129
  The High Court of Australia, which consists of a Chief Justice and six Associate Justices, is the 
country's supreme court and the final court of appeal for both the federal and state court systems.  The High 
Court of Australia—About the Court, http://www.hcourt.gov.au/justices_01.html (last visited Oct. 28, 
2008) (listing the names of the Chief Justice and the six Associate Justices). 
130
  Data Access v. Powerflex Services (1999) 202 C.L.R. 1, 31-33 (Austl.) (citing Mason, C.J. 
dissenting in Autodesk Inc. v. Dyason II 176 C.L.R. 300 (Austl.)). 
131
  See id. 
132
  See Githaiga, supra note 28, ¶¶ 4-21. 
133
  See LOUIS A. ALLEN, TIME BEFORE MORNING: ART AND MYTH OF THE AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINES 
33 (Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1975). 
134
  Id. 
135
  See Githaiga, supra note 28, ¶ 20. 
136
  See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), § 22 (Austl.). 
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The Act defines “material form” as “any form (whether visible or not) of 
storage of the work or adaptation, or a substantial part of the work or 
adaptation, (whether or not the work or adaptation, or a substantial part of 
the work or adaptation, can be reproduced).”137  The materiality requirement 
poses a significant problem for various works of folklore.  Indigenous 
folklore includes oral stories and ritualistic songs and dance.138  For instance, 
Dreaming stories represent a vital part of indigenous folklore, as these 
stories often provide the subject matter for indigenous works of art.139  These 
stories represent an oral tradition among individual clans, having been 
handed down from one generation to another.140  Because these 
representations of folklore are not expressed in material form, such works 
are not protected. 
Finally, various works of folklore within Aboriginal communities fail 
to meet the third requirement under the Copyright Act that the work have an 
identifiable author.  Although the Copyright Act provides protection for joint 
authorship of a work that is actually created by two or more authors, the Act 
does not recognize alternative forms of collective ownership.141  For 
instance, “membership of the author of a community whose customary laws 
invest the community with ownership of any creation of its members is not 
recognized.”142  Again, where the representations of Aboriginal folklore in 
oral stories and dance rituals do not have a recognizable author, such works 
fail to qualify for copyright protection. 
B. Even Where Communities Can Exercise a Copyright Interest Through 
a Trust or Fiduciary Relationship, the Protection Still Falls Short  
Australian courts, in cases such as Bulun Bulun, have found that under 
some circumstances, indigenous communities can force an author to exercise 
his copyright ownership to protect the work on behalf of the community.143  
As a result, the community can force the author to exercise his or her right to 
protect the work under the Copyright Act.  However, the moral rights 
provision under the Act grants the author the right to protect the work from 
                                                 
137
  See id. § 10. 
138
  Australian Government, Australian Indigenous Cultural Heritage, 
http://www.cultureandrecreation.gov.au/articles/indigenous/ (last visited Jun. 27, 2009); Australian 
Government, The Dreaming, http://www.cultureandrecreation.gov.au/articles/indigenous/dreamtime/ (last 
visited Jun. 27, 2009). 
139
  Bobbie Leigh, Dreaming Stories, 27 ART & ANTIQUES 82, ¶¶ 9-11 (2004) (Issue 9), available at 
http://www.annepetty.com/images/Dreaming_Stories.pdf. 
140
  Id. 
141
  See Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles Pty. Ltd. (1998) 86 F.C.R. 244, 247 (Austl.). 
142
  Id. 
143
 See id.  
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derogatory use.  These rights are inalienable and may only be exercised by 
the author of the work.144  Logically then, once the author dies, so too does 
the community’s ability to force the author to exercise the moral rights 
connected to the work. 
C. Proposed Communal Moral Rights Legislation Will Not Sufficiently 
Fill the Gaps in Protection of Communal Interests 
Future legislation extending moral rights to communities will not 
solve the Copyright Act’s inadequate protection of indigenous folklore.  
Indigenous communal moral rights represent the most likely next step in the 
Australian government’s attempt to protect communal works of indigenous 
folklore.  Members of Parliament seem to view indigenous communal moral 
rights as a great step forward in the scheme of protecting indigenous creative 
works.145  Such legislation, however, can just as easily be seen as merely a 
step sideways with regards to protection under the current legal framework.  
For instance, as evidenced by the court’s decision in Bulun Bulun, 
indigenous communities already have the ability to compel an author to 
enforce his or her rights, including moral rights, under the Copyright Act.  
Thus, legislation adding communal moral rights simply codifies a form of 
protection that courts have already recognized under the common law.  Such 
legislation would therefore provide no greater protection for most works 
than can currently be achieved under current Australian law.146 
One potential area of benefit could be an extended period of 
protection for works of folklore.  For instance, under the current Copyright 
Act, moral rights only last for the term of the copyright itself,147 meaning the 
life of the author plus 70 years.148  By allowing communities to exercise the 
moral rights in perpetuity throughout their existence, such legislation may 
actually provide at least some substantive benefit to communities.  However, 
without an actual bill to consider, it is mere speculation as to whether 
Parliament would consider granting perpetual protections under the 
Copyright Act when doing so would undermine one of the core theories of 
copyright law:  namely that authors will only be able to exercise their 
                                                 
144
  Copyright Act § 195AN(3) (Austl.). 
145
  See RICHARD ALSTON, DARYL WILLIAMS, & PHILIP RUDDOCK, Joint Media Release (May 2003), 
available at http://www.richardalston.dcita.gov.au/Article/0,,0_4-2_4008-4_114525,00.html. 
146
  See Ian McDonald, Australian Copyright Council staff attorney, Indigenous Communal Moral 
Rights (July 16, 2003), www.copyright.org.au/pdf/acc/articles_pdf/A03n24.pdf (article to be published in 
Australian Intellectual Property Law Bulletin).  
147
  Copyright Act, 1968, § 195AM(3) (Austl.). 
148
  Id. at § 33(2). 
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copyright for a specifically designed period of time before the material 
enters into the public domain to be used freely by everyone. 
Furthermore, it is likely communities would only be able to exercise 
their rights under very limited circumstances.  For instance, the proposed 
Draft Bill149 contained five conditions that would have to be met before a 
community would qualify for moral rights:  1) there must be a work, 2) the 
work must draw on the body of traditions or beliefs held in common by the 
indigenous community, 3) there must be an agreement between the 
community and the creator of the work, 4) there must be an 
acknowledgement of the community’s association with the work, and 5) 
interested parties in the work must consent to the initiation of the communal 
moral rights.150  Additionally, each condition “must be met before the first 
[commercial] dealing with the work, otherwise no rights arise.”151  Clearly, 
the third and fifth requirements require mutual consent by both the 
community and the author of the work prior to initiation of the moral rights.  
Thus, because the third and fifth (and perhaps even the fourth) requirements 
are conditional upon the creator’s own assent, it appears indigenous 
communities would have no legal control without the blessing of the author.  
It seems logical that if the author were willing to extend moral rights to 
communities, that same author would be willing to exercise his or her moral 
rights as a fiduciary of the community as in Bulun Bulun.  Thus, under this 
proposed regime, communal moral rights would not confer any additional 
benefits upon a community that wishes to protect a certain work of folklore.   
In fact, one author has suggested that, “[h]ypothetically speaking, under the 
draft Bill [i]ndigenous communal moral rights would not have been 
recognised in any of the copyright infringements that constitute Australian 
jurisprudence in this area.”152  Thus, what is needed is a legal tool that 
allows a community to protect its communal folklore when an author will 
not or cannot exercise his moral rights, despite the community’s request. 
Finally, these proposed communal moral rights, as with individual 
moral rights, would only apply to works that qualify for protection under the 
Copyright Act.  Thus, the proposed legislation would fail to bridge the wide 
gaps in the substance of copyright protection, such as for unfixed works, 
works with no identifiable author, and works that fail to qualify as original.   
Furthermore, when the copyright duration expires, anyone would have the 
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ability to copy the work, so long as the treatment was not derogatory.  Moral 
rights do not prevent the appropriation of a work once the copyright term 
expires.  Therefore, communal moral rights would be exercisable only where 
the community feels an artistic work will be subject to derogatory treatment.  
All other uses of the work will be sanctioned once the copyright term 
expires.  Thus, in order for communities to be able to assert an interest in 
their cultural works of folklore, they need greater protection than can be 
afforded by application of the Copyright Act alone. 
V. BY EXPANDING ITS PROTECTIVE SCOPE, THE HPA COULD PROVIDE THE 
NECESSARY SECURITY FOR COMMUNAL WORKS OF FOLKLORE 
The HPA was enacted in 1984 with the purpose of preserving and 
protecting areas and objects in Australia “that are of particular significance 
to Aboriginals in accordance with Aboriginal tradition.”153  The HPA enables 
the Commonwealth to initiate protection over these areas and objects when 
protection under the laws of the State or Territory falls short.154  Protections 
can either be short-term or long-term, and are backed by criminal 
sanctions.155  Although the HPA was introduced merely as a temporary 
measure, the sunset clause was removed in 1986 when it appeared that future 
land rights legislation would not be introduced.156 
A. The HPA Protects Aboriginal Areas and Objects of Particular 
Significance 
The scope of the HPA’s protections is somewhat narrow, limited to 
those objects and areas of archeological or scientific value.157  Contemporary 
works of folklore often do not qualify for protection.158  As such, the HPA 
would need to undergo revisions before communities would be able to 
effectively utilize the law to protect communal folklore.  Interestingly, until 
2006, the HPA did, in fact, afford some protection to contemporary works of 
folklore, albeit only with respect to Aboriginal objects and areas located in 
Victoria.159  In 1987, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage 
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Amendment Act (Amendment Act)160 added Part II.A to the HPA.  Part II.A 
applied only to Victoria,161 but expanded the definition of “Aboriginal 
cultural property” to include not only “places” and “objects,” but also 
“folklore.”162  Part II.A further defined “Aboriginal folklore” as “traditions 
or oral histories that are or have been part of, or connected with, the cultural 
life of Aboriginals (including songs, rituals, ceremonies, dances, art, 
customs, and spiritual beliefs) and that are of particular significance to 
Aboriginals in accordance with Aboriginal tradition.”163  The repeal of these 
provisions in 2006 left the HPA as it stands today, limited to protecting only 
significant Aboriginal objects and places from injury or desecration.164 
The HPA does not grant indigenous communities a private right of 
action to protect cultural property.  Instead, the HPA places the power of 
enforcement in the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs.165  An Aboriginal 
community that perceives a threat to a cultural object or place must file a 
complaint with the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs.166  The Minister has no 
obligation to declare an object or place protected—this is true whether the 
Minister receives a complaint or identifies a threat to cultural property in 
some other way.167  Although the Minister must consider a report prepared 
following an application by an Aboriginal community for the protection of a 
“specified area”168 (the “Area Report Requirement”), no such requirement 
exists for the protection of objects.169  With respect to applications for the 
protection of cultural objects, the Minister must consult with the appropriate 
Minister from the state or territory in which the problem arises in order to 
determine whether the law of that state or territory provides sufficient 
protection.170  The Honorable Elizabeth Evatt171 noted in her review of the 
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HPA (“Evatt Review”)172 that “[t]here is no right to a declaration of 
protection,” and the power to protect an area or site is entirely 
discretionary.173  Thus, although the HPA provides a process for protecting 
areas and objects of cultural importance, the enforcement mechanisms are 
vested in regulators rather than communities, and would have to be revised 
to provide substantive rights for Aboriginal communities. 
B. Compared to the Copyright Act, the HPA Provides a Superior 
Platform for Protecting Communal Works of Folklore  
When compared to the Copyright Act, the HPA has greater potential to 
adequately protect communal interests in works of folklore.  As discussed in 
Part II of this comment, the Copyright Act applies only to identifiable 
authors of a specific work.174  And, as noted in Part IV, even where a 
community may benefit from protection under the Copyright Act, the Act 
only affords protection for a limited period of time.175  Because Aboriginal 
cultural property descends from generation to generation, protection limited 
in duration does not adequately protect the communities’ interests.  Thus, the 
Copyright Act appears to be a poor platform for the exercise of communal 
interests.  The HPA, in contrast, could be a more appropriate vehicle for 
communities to exercise interests in communal works of folklore. 
Commentators have recognized the HPA’s potential as a means to 
protect indigenous communities against misuse and misappropriation of 
works of folklore176 and criticized the law for not establishing adequate 
protection for such works.177  In its current form, the HPA does not allow 
indigenous communities to protect works of folklore.  For instance, the law 
does not cover intangible aspects of culture such as oral histories and stories 
or ceremonies involving song and dance.178  The Evatt Review notes that the 
law does not cover all aspects of cultural heritage important to Aboriginal 
people and highlights the fact that it “makes no provision concerning 
intellectual property.”179  Indeed, “[m]ost applications under the Act have 
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related to areas and sites.”180  Even though it appears as though folklore in 
the form of tangible artistic works such as paintings or sculptures could 
qualify as “objects” under the HPA, this is not the case.  Under Australian 
cultural heritage laws, heritage is typically defined by its “scientific, 
historical, or archaeological value,”181 and such legislation fails to 
emphasize “living heritage,” and the cultural values of the community.182  
Contemporary forms of indigenous art thus do not appear to qualify for 
protection as “heritage” under Australia’s heritage laws.  Finally, an order of 
protection under the HPA is subject to the discretion of the Minister of 
Aboriginal Affairs,183 leaving indigenous communities largely incapable of 
exercising any affirmative or definitive power to protect their cultural works 
under the HPA.  As a result of these significant deficiencies within the law, 
the HPA currently is not equipped to address communal concerns regarding 
works of folklore. 
Despite the HPA’s current shortcomings, its goals provide a strong 
foundation for providing significant protection for indigenous folklore.  As 
stated in the Purposes of the Act, the HPA is intended to preserve and protect 
from injury and desecration “areas and objects that are of particular 
significance to Aboriginals in accordance with Aboriginal tradition.”184  
Additionally, the Evatt Review notes that the HPA “is a law for the benefit of 
Aboriginal people.”185  Communal works of folklore could fall squarely 
under the purposes of the HPA.  Indigenous communities do not wish to 
protect such works based on the works’ individual economic or societal 
value as would be the purpose under the Copyright Act, but rather to protect 
these works based on cultural value to the community.  Because 
communities view these communal works as sacred due to their traditional 
aspects and because these traditional aspects are at the very core of what 
indigenous communities desire to protect,186 the HPA is an ideal tool to 
safeguard these works of folklore.  By placing protection of such works 
under the umbrella of a law that more closely coincides with indigenous 
concerns and purpose, courts may find it much easier to enforce those 
protections. 
By extending protection to communal works of folklore, the HPA 
could effectively complement the Copyright Act’s individual protections 
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with communal protection over works of folklore in specific circumstances 
where individual protections would not suffice.  Such protections may 
appear to encroach upon the province of the Copyright Act.  Section 8 of the 
Act provides that “copyright does not subsist otherwise than by virtue of this 
Act.”187  Further protections provided under the HPA for copyrightable 
works (artistic works, performances, etc.) may be seen as a de facto 
copyright protection that should be barred under the Copyright Act.  
However, by placing the emphasis on protection of the underlying tradition 
and culture that folklore represents, the HPA may be viewed not as 
legislation tangentially extending copyright, but rather as existing legislation 
being expanded to include additional cultural works.  Also, under the HPA, 
protections are extended only as a “last resort.”188  This emphasis could 
remain an underlying goal of a revised HPA.  Thus, the Copyright Act’s 
protections could still remain valid and controlling except where such 
protections fall short.  Under circumstances where the protection falls 
outside of the copyright realm, HPA provisions protecting communal works 
would be triggered, thereby providing communities with an avenue of relief 
that is otherwise unavailable under the Copyright Act. 
By widening the scope of the HPA’s focus to include a broader 
definition of cultural objects that encompasses works of folklore similar to 
that of Part II.A, the HPA could be used to effectively protect indigenous 
works of folklore throughout the country.  A revised HPA could place the 
power of protection with the courts as opposed to the Minister of Aboriginal 
Affairs.  Instead of granting indigenous communities a passive right to bring 
their concerns to an official who is under no obligation to extend adequate 
protections, the HPA could grant certain rights on behalf of the community 
to protect their property in a similar fashion to the protection afforded to 
artists under the Copyright Act and provide a judicial review mechanism for 
administering such rights.  In determining whether a certain work of folklore 
requires protection under a revised HPA, the courts could use an objective 
test measured by indigenous customary law.  Prior cases indicate that courts 
are relatively comfortable using indigenous customary law to determine 
whether indigenous interests merit legal protection.  For instance, in Bulun 
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Bulun, the Federal Court was willing to recognize a fiduciary relationship 
between the Galanbingu community and an individual artist once the Court 
determined that under customary law and tradition the relationship between 
artist and community was one of trust.189  In a similar vein, where a 
community has expressed concern regarding a work of folklore, courts could 
determine whether, under the customary law and tradition, the community 
has an interest in the work and whether the interest warrants protection by 
the HPA. 
The courts have provided similar tests in determining whether to 
recognize Aboriginal communal rights in property.  In Mabo v. The State of 
Queensland [No. 2],190 the High Court found that the common law of 
Australia recognized a form of native title where the right to such title is 
grounded in the customs or laws of the people.191  The High Court 
emphasized the importance of looking to evidence of traditional laws and 
customs of the community that give rise to an interest in the land.192  This 
analysis by the court could be transplanted into the context of protection of 
folklore:  where the community is able to provide evidence that their 
“traditional laws and customs” give rise to an interest in the work, the 
community could maintain a claim for the protection of such works under 
the HPA. 
By granting similar rights to an individual author under the Copyright 
Act and to a community under the HPA, there may initially appear to be a 
conflict between the two laws.  Where a community has an interest in 
opposition to those interests of the individual creator, should the individual’s 
interests win out under Copyright law, or should the communal interests take 
precedence under the HPA?  Although it may seem that a conflict of interests 
could present a serious problem, the courts have already defined a solution.  
In Bulun Bulun, where both the individual author and the community 
expressed different claims in a single work, the Federal Court was able to 
address both concerns by applying the communities’ customary laws.  
Communities will only have a valid claim where the creator of the work of 
folklore has in some way been given permission by the community to create 
a work, or has otherwise appropriated some cultural aspect that the clan 
perceives as being owned by the community.  Thus, customary law would 
draw the boundary lines with regard to whether the law governing the 
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individual (copyright) or the law governing the community (HPA) should 
apply. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has argued that the Australian Copyright Act does not 
adequately protect Aboriginal folklore.  The Copyright Act protects only 
original works with identifiable authors that are reduced to a material form.  
These requirements are problematic in the context of indigenous folklore.  
Indigenous artwork and other cultural works draw on traditional designs and 
culture that have evolved over many generations, and, as such are not 
original and do not have readily identifiable creators in the classic sense.  
Furthermore, indigenous folklore includes oral stories and dance ceremonies 
that do not fall under the formal materiality requirement articulated in the 
Copyright Act.  Though amendment of the Copyright Act could address 
these issues to a limited extent, more adequate protection would be better 
achieved by amending the HPA. 
As the U.N. Declaration discussed above illustrates, there is an 
international consensus that indigenous people have a right to have their 
heritage and folklore protected.  If Australia hopes to keep pace with human 
rights standards, it should consider placing protections outside the realm of 
copyright law.  The HPA’s goals parallel indigenous concerns regarding their 
folklore.  By amending the HPA to include certain enforcement mechanisms 
and to extend its protective scope, the law could prove an effective new tool 
for Australia’s indigenous communities to protect their folklore and their 
heritage. 
